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CHAPTER 1.
The Develo mont of the Field for the Promoter.
The amount of capital invested in manufactures "in the
Ur.ited States is constantly on the increase. At present the sum
invested is about ten billion dollars as against twelve billion
dollars invested in transportation and twenty-two billion in
agriculture 1 pursuits. The amounts invested in various manufactur-
ing industries varies widel3% from the iron and steel industry,
j|
"with its investment of nearly two billion dollars, down +.0 the
lace industry with a total invested capital of less than a
million. However great or however small the industry there has
been in the oast decade one uniform tendency in all manufacturing
lines, the tendency to consolidate. One might say a tendency array
from competitions Possibly we find stronger evidences of this
tendency somewnat earlier in the transportation than in the
Organisations
preceding manufacturing business. Thus we have the
corporat ions.
great Chicago-Omaha pool formed in 1870 between the three lines
connecting those cities. However, it ws only a question of
time until pools and pooling arrangements became ^uite pbmmon
in manufacturing circles. Being as they were a division of
territory, or of profits, or at least an understanding among
several manufacturers whereby profit was to accrue to all con-
s'
cerned, they had no cohesive force. Their weakness lay in their
inability to force their agreement against offending members.
They being found inadequate, gave way to another form of orgs
nization.

In 1882 we have the organization of the Standard Oil
Trust, in this fori.: of organization the holders of the stock of
the various companies surrender their shares to the trustees of
the trust end receive in return trust certificates upon which
profits are declared. The "Sugar Trust n , "Whiskey Trust", and
scores of otVer trusts were soon organized. Pro i the very outset
public opinion was against them. Many states enacted legislation
hostile to them, and their path gave promise of "being an unpleasant
one when this form of organization was virtually put an end to
by the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in the case of
the Sugar trust (Referee of the State of IT. Y. vs. North River
Refining Co., 121 N. Y. 582); whose action in surrendering its
stock and its powers of independent control into the hands of
the trust, the court declarec to be illegal as being ultra vires.
It is a fact worth noticing that throughout the history of the
attempts of independent companies to form some kind of a union
when the law of the land intervenes they do not return to their
original status; but something different follows. In the case
of the Sugar Trust it became an individual corporation; and thus
we have the form of combination assumed by the so called trusts
of today.
Since 1890 this form of combination has been going on
with great rapidity. However their growth in number has net
been a continuous one. For the next few yea^s following 1890 up
to 1892 there was a tremendous increase in number of the corpora-
tions formed.
.
This number diminished during the money scarcity
following the panic of 1893. The year of 1897-8 marked a reaction
in the formation of corporations. During this period many of the

corporations most familiar to the American public were formed.
Toward the close of the year of 1899 the sharp falling off In
the Roles of the securities cf such corporations, together with
the stringency in the money market caused another Cessation in
this work. The period following this r< action was marked by
the formation of the most colossal of all organizations, the United
States steel Corporation. Such, in brief, is the history of the
organization movement of industrial corporations up to the prese:
tine. During this period fully one seventh the capital invested
in manufacturing interests has been combined.
Concerning the growth of combinations in the field of
transportation v/e have already spoken of the Ghicago-Omaha Pool
of 1870. Follov/ing this pool came the Southwestern Association,
organized in 1870, dealing with the traffic centering in St.
Louis; The Southern Ry. and Steamship Association, which even-
tially came to include nearly all of the railways of the South;
and in the East the pools cf the roads connecting Chicago and the
Sea-board, as well as the Anthracite Goal combinations. The
means employed to secure the successful working of these pools
were various, sometimes a division of profit, sometimes a division
of earnings, or perhaps a division of territory. With the passage
of the Interstate Commerce act of 183G the railroads were forced
to cease open pooling arrangments; and there grew up more strongly
than before the system of absorption of the smaller lines by the
larger ones until at present the greater part of the transportation
business of the United States is carried on by less than a score
of companies.
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The function By this time, no doubt, the question has been
of the
promoter. asked in the minds of many what has all the
foregoing to do with the promoter either directly or indirectly?
It is in a brief way a statement of the history o^ the conditions
that made it possible for the promoter to do his work; as well
as a statement of the immense size of his field of activity which
makes his operations of such vital importance to our economic
wellfare. Before we c-^n reach a conclusion as to the benefit,
or the evils, arising from his work to the public, to the in-
vestor, and to the industries concerned we must go with some
minutness of detail, into the operations as carried cut bythis
individual.
By a detailed study of his methods, as well as the con-
ditions which prevailed in the industry which made them possible,
we are in a position to judge with more accuracy of his position
in the industrial world. Whether he is really a legitimate fac-
Purpose of the tor, a man for whom there is a legitimate need,
investigation.
and one for whom there is an economic need
must be decided by the reader in a large measure according to
his convictions concerning the desirability or non-desirability
of combinations. That is not the aim of this work. It is rather
an investigation of the conditions which rendered his work
possible; his motives in doing it; whether he is likely to find
a permanent place in our economic system; whether his work is
likely to endure; is he favored too much by our state laws; his
profits and his honesty to the public. These ere some of the
things for which a solution is sought in this investigation.
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Possibly as the tenn promoter is rather pn jndef inate
one in the minds of many, it might be well to state with some
degree of accuracy the meaning intended to be conveyed by that
word. "If" according to Professor Jenks" several different firms
or corporations are to be combined into one, or if a large cor-
poration is to be formed, it is ordinar\11y true that some indi-
vidual must undertake the tash of carrying on the negot iat ions
among the different establishments, or individuals concerned,
of providing a plan of organization, and of persuading the dif-
ferent individual owners that it is to their advantage to enter
into the combinations on the terms suggested. This persuasive
optimist who can succeed ""'n convincing each that it is for his
interest to join the organization is the promoter"
With the larger industrial corporations came the pro
moter. It ccn readily be seen that under the conditions pro-
ceeding their advent he was not known. A pool was an agreement
reached only among the owners, or the managers directly inter-
ested, yet we have a notable instance where these parties put
the task of adjusting the working of the pool into outside hands;
as in the case where the East and West Trunk lines called in the
service of Albert Fink to help them reach a pooling basis
equitable as between themselves. The work of Mr. Pink was in no
sense the work of a promoter. The promoter is a manufacturer
first of all, a laanufacturer of securities. On the one hand he
gathers together the various properties which he is to knit to-
gether into a whole; on the other hand he presents the securities
Methods of which are sup osed to represent the value of .these
pro;.lot ion.
propert ies to the investing public. The diversity of conditions

under which he labors may cause to a certain extent some variation
in the method of operation. In the Moore method he buys the
property outright, going to each mill owner and getting a cash
option on his property. After making arrangements for the acqui-
sition of the various properties he proceeds to form his company.
In so doing he works with the end in view that ultimately the
conveyors of the properties will prefer stock in the new company
to cash. Therefore he capitalises the new company sufficiently
large, so that after paying all the vendors and the expense of
organization, there remains a large block of stock to go to the
promoter for his work. The capital stock is usually divided into
two classes, common and preferred. The former usually represent-
ing the actual cash value of the property and the latter the good
will, the franchises, trade marks, patents, etc. It is out of
the last class of stock the promoter usually gets his pay.
# Moore Method. Report of Industrial Commission. 1 Vol. 760.
Another method of promotion is when the parties de-
siring to consolidate get together and do the work of promotion
of their own free volition without the aid of outside assistance.
Th^s latter method is not very common because of the great dif-
ficulty that the various owners of the plants have in coming
to an agreement on the prices of their property; each one think-
ing his property much more valuable than that of his neighbors.
A third method is that of a body of men forming a
syndicate and, going together into the open market, buying a
sufficient amount of securities of the various interest which
they wish to control, to give them a dominant power in the affairs
of their organizations; and then proceeding to consolidate these
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properties in such manner as they think best serves their pur-
pose. This last method is used mostly in the case of railway
propert ies.
Such is a synopsis of some of the lethods used by the
promoter; but to see how y\e does it, the amount of money required
to do it, from whense this money comes, the inducements made to
the owners to sell to him their plants, as well as those held
out to the public to get them to buy securities, and the manner
in which he disposes of his securities it is necessary to make
a detailed study of some cf the more representative cases.
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C ILATTER 2.
• American Tin Tlate Company.
Judge Moore of Chicago is the most widely known of- all promot-
ers. To his credit is placed the promotion of the Diamond Match
Co., National Biscuit Co., American Tin Tlate Co., Federal Steel
Co., National Steel Co., American Steel Hoop Co., and later on, the
reorganization of the Rock Island Railway system. It was after
him that the Moore method, previously referred to, took its name;
"because first so extensively used "by him. Of all these companies
the promotion of the American Tin Tlate Co. is perhaps the most
typical
.
#The American Tin Tlate Co. was incorporated under the state
laws of New Jersey, January 6th, 1899. It s authorized capital
stock being $50,000,000;' #20, 000, 000, 1% cumulative preferred, and
$30,000,000 common. Of this sum $16,000,000 preferred and
$28,000,000 common has been issued. Not only the causes but also
the methods of its organization has "been given very fully in the
report of the Industrial Commission for 1900. Erom this report the
causes leading up to its organization are given as excessive com-
petition. The price of tin plate had fallen from $5.20 per box in.
1892, after the passage of the McKinley bill, to $2.60 in 1899.
The tariff at this time was $1.50 per hundred. Griff iths( an inde-
pendent manufacturer) states that although the profits had fallen
from 100/i to 20€ well managed companies were making good profits.
Mr. Reid, the president of the Tin Plate Co., in his testimony
states that most companies were not making any profits.
#Report of Industrial Commission 1900, 1 Vol. 896-912.
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In view of this state of affairs the owners of tin plate mills de-
cided that some form of organization was necessary to enable them
to keep up profits. After failing in the attempt to reach some form
of an agreement among themselves they decided to call in the ser-
vices of Judge Moore. With that end in view a committee of tin
plate manufacturers waited on him in 1897. He was at that time en-
gaged in organizing the National Biscuit Co. About a year after
the first overtures were made to him he decided to undertake the
task.
In the place of acting as an intermediary he proceeded to get
#
cash options on the various plants. In other words he proceeded
to get possesion of them himself. To' do this required large sums
of money, which he collected from various sources. He borrowed
large, amounts personally, and also raised large amounts by advance
subscriptions from outside capitalists. Each mill owner was ap-
proached separately, and the amount agreed upon as the purchase
price was kept a secret. As he, himself, said this was necessary,
since every mill owner thought his plant better than his neighbors,
in a better location, and in every way more valuable. Although a
cash option, the owner was given the privilege of taking his pay in
the securities of the new company if he so preferred. As most of
them desired to remain in the business when they saw that the pro-
motion was going to be a success it required but little capital in
order to complete the deal. The inducement offered to mill owners
to sell was largely that of the hope of higher prices for tin plate
in case of a combination; although the argument of economies in op-
eration on a large scale was pressed somewhat. That the former was
^Report of Ind . Com. 1900, 1 Vol. 759-63.
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the chief inducement however is shown, not only by the attempt to
secure as nearly all the mills as possible in order to have a mo-
nopoly in the tin plate "business; "but also in subsidizing, for a
term of five years, all the manufacturers of tin plate machinery
in order to retain this monopoly.
The exact selling price of these plants is not known; "but the
general prices paid were higher than they would have been at a
priva.te sale. Mr. Peid testified that at the prices of materials
prevailing at that time, a. ten mill plant would cost about
$400,000 A twenty mill plant would cost more than twice as much;
while it would be necessary to furnish about $25,000 working cap-
ital for each mill.
Mr. Griffith, who sold out to the combination and has since
been running an independent plant, stated that he received 25 to
30/j more than the original cost of his plant. Ke also stated that
the impression was a very general one that the standard price paid
was $40,000 a mill for each plant. This sum included good will and
everything. He estimated that $12,000,000 was ample to allow for
the cost of reproduction of the plants, good will and everything
at the time they were purchased.
:
'r. Moore declined to affirm the cost price. Two or three
witnesses made the statement that the actual cash value was fully
represented by the preferred stock, or $18,000,000. All things
considered $18,000,000 would seem a conservative estimate to put
on the value of the property received.
In lieu of each $100 in cash the mill owners had the option of
receiving ftlOO preferred stock, par value, and $100 common stock,
^Report of Ind . Com. 1900,1 Vol.8 12

ar value. In case they exercised this option, which they uniform-
ly did 10, 000, 000 of common stock was left in Judge Moore's hands.
In the course of the promotion he had issued whatever stock he
deemed de sir; Lie and necessary in order to secure the various
plants, and furnish the amount of working capital agreed upon. By
fixing the capitalization of the new company at his ovm discretion
he virtually fixed his own margin of profits. He explained the
large amount of stock retained by stating: "The organization of
the Company involved very great risk: capital from the outside was
hard to secure, and the manufacturers hard to "bring together; a
strong and effective combination must* be assured in order to sell
the stock; Therefore the necessity of tonuses. Just what he re-
ceived for his common stock is not known. At one time its market
price was $44 .00 . 3y disposing of this common stock retained by
him at that time his profits would have been about $4,400,000 for
promoting the Company.
.
#As soon as Judge Moore had obtained possession of the va-
rious plants he proceeded to plan the form of organization and also
to choose the officials. This he did with a great deal of care for
not only was the form of organization important, the success of the
sale of its stock depended quite largely upon the class of men at
its head. To further the sale of the securities to the public he
presented in the prospectus what was said to be a carefully pre-
pared estimate of sales, earnings and profits for 1898.
These estimates were as follows: The gross' output of the mills was
stated to be 7,633,000 boxes of tin plate. On the basis of the then
operating expenses a profit of 35 cents, or $2,671,754 was made by
#Report of Industrial Com. 1 Vol. 759-63.
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tlne mills when the price was lowest. Under the new arrangements
the operating expenses were to he reduced "by $1,000,000. After
deducting $1,^60,000 for the preferred stock, $2,441,000 would he
left as dividends for the common stock. In order that the share
holders might receive the "benefit of the earnings of the company,
a provision was made in the Charter forbidding the directors to
reserve a surplus fund not chargeahle with the payment of dividends
so if any dividends were earned they would he divided. Unfortunate-
ly for the common stock holders no dividends as yet, have ever "been
earned. It was also provided that no mortgage should he made except
with the consent of two thirds of the shareholders in writing.
Both directors and executive committee were to he elected directly
hy the people: Such were the provisions made to safe guard the
interest of the man who should seek the Tin Plate Company as a
field for investment.
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United States Ship Building Company.
From work of promotion successful in every sense of the word
from the promoters point of view we turn to one whose ignominious
failure, and whose financial loss to the promoters, must stand as
a warning against the too reckless flotations of industrial enter-
prises, the "United States Ship Building Company".
From the very fact of its instability, its quick relapse into
the receiver's hands, more light has been thrown on the inside
facts concerning its formation and financiering than any of the
larger corporations. But few reflect less credit on the promot-
ers. Within nine months after its organization proceedings were
instituted f or a receiver.
From the facts as gleaned from the report of the Receiver,
from thfe matters brought to light in the case of Roland H. Conkli.i
and other holders of the first mortgage bonds against the United
States Ship Building Co., and Mr. Schwab; as well as from the
"Photograph of the Organization of the Company". By Mr. L. W.
Sammis the following information is presented.
The Company was incorporated under the laws of Few Jersey,
June 17, 1902; the incorporators being H. K. Wood, H. S. Gould.
#
and Kenneth McLoren and the capital stock :''3,000. This Company
under date of June 14, 190° issued a prospectus with the view of
inducing the public to subscribe for $9 , 000 , 000 of its first
mortgage bonds. This prospectus not only stated that the Company
was incorporated under the state laws of Few Jersey; it set out a
list of cen directors, it stated that the subsidiary plants' of the
#Report of the Receiver.
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Company, exclusive of the Bethlehem Steel Co. were going concerns
that had "been appraised at $20,000,000; their working capital
was over $5,000,000; the contracts in hand for work amounted to
over $36,000,000 on which the estimated profits amounted to over
$5,000,000. It implied that the Capital Stock was #20, 000, 000.
#0n June 24th F. K. Seward, Raymond Newman and Louis P.
Dailey, having been transferred each a share of the common stock,
were elected directors. This was the directorate which purchased
the subsidiary plants; raised the capital stock (with the consent
of the stock holders) from $3,000 to $45,000,000 and issued secur-
ities to the value of $70,000,000. when a permanent organization
was effected they all resigned. Seward was asked by Alexander
and Green to act as a director, and received $20 for his services
in that capacity.
On the same date, June 24th, on which the hoard of directors
organized and increased the capital stock they received and ac-
cepted an offer from one, John W. Young, to sell them the follow-
ing properties, whose total values have since been appraised at
#12,441,516 .26 ; -Union Iron Works, San Francisco, California;
Harlan and Hollingsworth Co., Wilmington, Delaware; Eastern Ship
Building Co., Carteret, New Jersey; Crescent Shipyard Co., New
Jersey; Samuel L. Moore and Sons Co., Ne.w Jersey; Bath Iron Works,
Bath, Maine; Bethleham Steel Co., Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.
In consideration for this property Young was to receive
$19,998,500 in par value of preferred stocks; $24,908,500 in par
value of common stocks $16,000,000 par value of the first mortgage
5% sinking fund, 30 yr. gold bonds (these bonds were to be secured
#Rece iver's Report.
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by a mortgage on all the property except the Bethlehem Co.); and
$10,000,000 20 yrs . gold bonds secured by a mortgage upon the
shares of the Bethlehrm Co. were to be deposited with the 1Tew York
Security and Trust Co., under a mortgage or a deed of trust. This
mortg-ge was also to be a lien, subject to the priority of the
$16,000,000 bonds, upon the rest of the property of the Shipbuilding
Company. The bonds thus issued on this mortgage were to have equal
voting powers with the stocks; one thousand dollars par value of
the bonds having tv e same voting power as one thousand dollars
par value of the stock. The remaining provisions were that the
Bethlehem Steel Corn-any, as long as the bonds were outstanding,
was to remain a distinct and separate corporation; it was to pay
dividends upon its capital stock of not less than $900,000
annually, and it was to be protected in keeping on hand annually
cash assets of not 'less than #4,000,000 as its working capital.
Immediately upon the acceptance of this offer the stock holders
ratified it and took steps to provide for the bond issue.
Between the fifth and twelfth of August the subsidiary
companies turned over their properties to the present company by
means of deeds and bills of sale. With the acceptance of the
Bethlehem Steel Company the various vendors received $6,000,000
cash, $4,0 0,000 bonds and #11,150,000 in each kind of stock. The
Bethlehem Steel Co. cost the Ship Building people $10,000,000
collateral mortgage bonds, $10,000,000 each of common and preferred
stocks
.
#Relation of the Financial Trust Co. to the Industrial Trust, p. 30
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The above facts represents what may he called the current
history of the company in relation to the public wfl ich was asked
to "buy its stocks and bonds. Being in possession of these facts
the inside manipulations of the promoting and underwriting he-
comes of interest. #The promoter of this company was J. W. Young.
Mr. Young had been talking this matter up some months previous to
his meeting with, Mr. Nixon in the fall of 1900 yet he had made nc
substantial headway. #rMr. Nixon had recently purchased the
Crescent Ship Yards at Elizabethport , N. J. for about $7,000 and
organized a company capitalized for $1,120,000 retaining in his
name all the stock except enough to qualify the directors. Young
interested Fixon by allowing him an ojjtion which he had on the
Newport News Sh:ip ?>uilding and Dry Dock Co. Mr. Nixon gave him an
option on his own plant and agreed to assist him. #//#Col. John J.
McCook, a director 'in the Mercantile Trust Company and a partner
in the lav; firm of Alexander and C-reen agreed to assist him. He
became counsel for J. W. Young, the United States Ship Building
Co., and Nixon and Dresser in their joint capacity as the Ship
Building Syndicate. They secured options on other companies and
prepared a prospectus for issue May 7, 1901 but owing to the
Northern Pacific panic the project fell through with. #//##Mr
.
Daniel Le Roy Dresser was president of the Trust Co. of the Re-
public, the capitalization of which was £1,000,000. It began
business March 31st, 1902; and its main purpose was the lending of
money to Southern cotton growers. When he firs' met Mr. Young,
#The Relation of the Financial Trust Co. to the Indust. Trust P. 7
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which meeting was "brought about through the agency of Col. J. J.
McCook, Mr. Young spoke to him in regard to trading in America
industrial securities on "behalf of a. French Syndicate. In a few
weeks this project was dropped and the promotion of the Ship
Building Co. was substituted. A preliminary prospectus was issued
without the name of a "banker; hut with the Mercantile Trust Co. as
trustee of the mortgage and transfer agents of the stocks. The
Trust Co. of the Republic became the banker. #According to the
digest of a memorandum given by Mr. Sammis at this time it was
proposed to dispose of #9,000,000 bonds and $2,500,000 stocks of
each kind in order to realize $8,100,000 cnsh. Of the cash and
securities then remaining in hand $6,400,000 cash, $4,050,000
bonds, $4,000,000 preferred and $4,050,000 common stock were to be
paid to the owners of the properties to be acquired, leaving
$1,700,000 cash, $2,950,000 bonds, $3,750,000 of preferred stoc 1
and $2,750,000 common stock. Of this $1,500,000 in cash and
$1,500,000 bonds were to be retained in the treasury of the pro-
posed combinations for working capital. This left ?200,000 cash,
$500,000 bonds $5^750,000 each of preferred and common stock,- a
grand total of $9,150,000, figuring the securities at par, to go
to the promoters. From it they were to pay the expenses of pro-
motion. This division of the capital was made on the basis of a
stock is rue of $20,000,000.
#The $9,000,000 of bonds to be offered to the public was
under- wr:i t ten under agreement between the Mercantile Trust Co. of
New Jersey, and various under-writers of America and France. The
agreement provided that the bonds should be offered to the' public
#T e relation of the Financial Trust Co. to the Industrial Trust.
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through such h-\n -ers as might he designated hy the Mercantile
Trust Co. Accordingly in May 1902, J. J. NcCook called on the
Trust Co. of the Republic and asked them to act as hankers in the
operation of placing $3,000,000 of the "bonds on the market in
America, their contract being sim
x
ly to procure underwriters to the
underwriting contracts. Young appeared with him the ne^t time and
they asked the Trust Co. to agree to underwrite ah out $2 ,000 ,000
more as England had declined to take her share; so it had heco i
necessary to ask the French and American underwriters to increase
their amounts. By the terms of the underwriting agreement the
$9,000,000 bonds were to he underwritten at 90, and each under-
writer to receive a bonus of 25$> of his underwriting - in both kinds
of stocks. They were to be offered to the public at 9 7 1-2. On
June 14th, the date of the appearance of the public prospectus,
they were offered -f or sale, the American public taking only
$490,000 of them. They were, however, sold in November to a
syndicate of New York Bankers, which syndicate also holds most of
the common and preferred stocks. The bonds were taken over by
the syndicate on condition that they pay the Trust Co. one half the
amount which
A
realized on their sale.
##In Prance, after Young had assured the underwriters that the
enterprise was a success, and thay began to think that all was
over but drawing their share of the profits, it was found necessary
to make a call for the first payments from them. Kr . Alexander of
the firm of Alexander and Green took the matter in charge, and in
order to bolster up French confidence in the enterprise made many
misleading statements to the French capitalists. They refused to
^'Report of the Receiver. ,
4&Telation of the Financial Trust Co. to the Indust. Trust. P. 21
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advance the cash, and this in spite of the fact, that the date set
for the deliver:; of the properties was fast approaching when it
would >>e necessary for the promoters to have the money.
To better show the crisis which was facing the promoters at
this time, i t is necessary to go back a little. As originally
contemplated, the United States Shipbuilding Co. did not include
the Bethlehem Steel Co. About the 12th. of June, however, Schwab
made overtures to the promoters to sell them the Bethlehem Steel
Co. this company was earning at the rate of about $1,500,000 a
year, also it would enable the Shipbuilding people to build
armored vessels for the government, hence its des irability . But
in the terms by which it was to be acquired all of the titles to
the other subsidiary companies were to be vested in the Shipbuild-
ing Co., it having paid for them .before taking over the Bethlehem
WW
Steel Co. The Bethlehem people refused an extension of time.
Therefore to secure the money needed, although the Shipbuilding
Co. had no right whatever to issue any bonds prior to August the
11th., the date it was to take over the properties, >Tixon and
Dresser took these bonds and the other funds of the Trust Co. of
the Republic to other institutions where they deposited them; also
giving them their joint note, and the guarantee of the Trust Co.
of the Republic. The money advanced to then was made payable to
them personally. These sums were deposited with the Trust Co. of
the Republic. In this way, through the funds of the Trust Co. of
trie Republic, Uixon and Dresser secured $3,6 72,187.50 in cash,
#and
##Relation of the Financial Trust Co. to the Indust. Trust pp 17-1$
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which supplemented by the $2 ,327 , 81° . 50 receive from the under-
writers enabled them to take over the roperties. Since the sum of
.'•6,000,000 was deposited with the Trust Co. of the Republic it
could not loan it to its president; therefore this sum was lo-ned
to Lewis Mixon in return for his personal note secured by the
stocks and bonds of the Shipbuilding Go.
The sum of $3 ,6 n 2 ,187.50 loaned by the Trust Cc. of the Re-
public to Ivixon and Dress or on the strength of the subscriptions
of the French underwriters was afterwards reduced to $982 ,334 . 10
#
which sum that Company lost in the venture.
On the 12th of August the Bethlehem Co. was taken over. As
previously stated this property was purchased of Mr. Schwab for
$10,000,003 in bonds, he alleging that it had cost him ?7 ,000,000
or $24.00 a share the previous November. When the contract cane to
be drawn up it provided that J. P. Morgan and Co. were to be the
vendors, and they were to receive $7,246,871.48 in cash for the
property as well as $2,500,000 in each kinds of Stocks. Schwab
furnished the cash. In return for that he received $10,000,000
in bonds -nd $'7
, 500, 000 in eacv kinds of stocks.. This $10,000,
in bonds as previously stated was to have the same voting power as
the stocks, thus making Schwab virtually master of the new company.
##Furthermore by an agreeement made between Dresser and : Tixon
of the first part and Schwab and Morgan of the second part and
HaJjTis and Gates of the third part on the 11th of August 1902, the
stock was to be distributed as follows: -10,000,000 of each kind
went to Morgan and Schwab in part payment for the "Bethlehem plant,
^Relation of the Financial Trust Co. to the Indust . Trust, p. 33.
##'^ew York Journal of Co-r^erce and Commercial Bulletin Oct. 18, 1903

$1,500,000 of each kind to "be distributed amon? the various ven-
dors of the properties to the Shipbuilding Company of which Nixon
was one, and the remainder of the stocks to he deposited with the
Trust Co. not to he transferred or disposed of until the other
stocks were sold.
This in brief is the history of the pro-notion of an organ-
isation where a total disregard for conservatism and even ordinary
business discretion paved for it a speedy path to ruin.

International Mercentile Marine Company.
Turning from the attempt made by Mr. Nixon to promote
the United States Shipbuilding Co. to that of Wall Street's most
successful financeer in promoting the International Mercantile
Marine we see at once the superior powers of organization poss-
essed by Mr. Morgan.
#When J. P. Morgan and Co. purchased the Leyland
portatlon line, in May, 1901, it was currently stated that the
intention was to secure an independent line for the trans-
portation cf the Steel Trust products, as well as to expedite the
Ship Subsidy Bill then 'pending. Further developments of facts,
however, disclosed another purpose in view. This purchase marked
the beginning of the organization of the International Mercantile
Marine Co. This Company included the following lines:
No. of Ton- Capt. Dividends Bonds.,
vessels, nage Stock. in 1902.
#L. White Star Line 29 266,000 !$3,750,000 10$
2. Intornat. Nav. Co. 24 179,000 .14,200,000 4$ $13,686,000
( a ) Red Star Line,
(b) American Line.
3. Leyland 46 293, OOO 2,615,000 G'/j
4. Atlantic Transport . 20 195,000 5,000,000 1-2$
5. Dominion.
__8_ 74 ,000 3 ,000 ,000
Totals 127 907,000 40,658,900 $13 ,686 ,000
The total capitalized value of the properties taken over
including their bonds, appro x imating the value of the Dominion line^
# The Economist, 645 vol. 60.
##Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin, May 19, 1902.
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ot #3,000,000, was about #54,000,000.
t The principal lines not included were:
No. of Capt. Dividends
vessels Tonn-age stock, in 1900.
1. Hamburg-American. 2 79 661.3.35 $25, 000,000 6%
2. North German Floyd. 315 587.000 25,000,000 6f>
3. American S. S. Co. 24 14.410 10,0 0,000
( Including vessels in
the oriental trade.
)
Holland American. 10 79,000 8,000,000
Total 628 1.341,745 68,000,000
fThe following is a brief history of the various subsidiary Cos:
Leyland Line; Incorporated 1901; including Frederick
Leyland and Co., Limited; Wilson and Furniss Leyland Line, Limited.
Vest India and Pacific Steamship Co. , Limited. Its total crpital
stock was f 2,800,000 issued in 150,000 5$ preference shares and
130,000 common.
white Star Line: The fleet of steamers which nailed
under the flag of the White Star, belonged to the Oceanic Steam
Navigation Cc.Ismay, Imire and Co. This was a nrivate concern,
originally chartered in 1869 and # 400,000 capital in f 1,000
shares. In 1872 this was increased to f 500,000 and a little
later to -f 750,000. It has no directors.
#?/#Tntern8t
-
: onal Navigation Company: This company was
incorporated in New Jersey, June 6th, H893. it owned the Red
Stsr and American Lines. In addition to its capital stock of
$14,200,000 it had $13,500,000.
#Com. and In. Chronicle 74 vol. 888
iHJournal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin, May 21st 1902.
///investors Supplement 1900, page 164.

underly lng bonds
.
The Atlantic Transport Co. , Limited. Registered in
1889 with a capital stock of #100,000 in 20 shares. By 1839 it
had increased its cepital stock to #900, 000. In that yepr it
took over t" e Atlantic Transport Co. of West Virginia. In 1900
$1,000,000 was added to the Company in the form of preferred
stocks none of which however, has been issued.
Having this knowledge of the constituent companies,
their properties, the amount of their capitalizations and their
ownership we pre ready for an inquiry as to how they were com-
bined together to form what is popularly known as the "'Stearashi
Combine".
This work wan mainly accomplished in +.v>e latter half of
1902 when the'^e.public was already over satiated w,ith securities,
in the face of the distrust of the British ship owners, a hostile
English press and 'a stringent money market. It had however two
redeeming features, it was backed by J. P. Morgan end Co. , and
n
't was undertaken at a time when the profits of the shipping
industry had been abnormal. Yet the fact that Mr. Morgan was
able to take these properties, whose total value did not exceed
$54,000,000. place them on the market with a total capital of
$170,000,000 speaks well for his ability as a finaneeer.
As has been previously st- ted the Leyland Lino was the
first line secured by Mr. Morgan. tRq secured control of this
line in May 1901 by purchasing its common stock, paying -£14, 10s
for each fl4 shares. Their market value at that time was #14.
The company retained its preferred stock. Mr. Morgan's next move
was to get possession of the White Star, Dominion, American and
# Economists , 60 Vol. 645.

Atlantic lines. #• This was accomplished by a provisionary agree-
ment of Fob. 4th, 1902. This agreement was made optional on
the part of Morgan and Co. until April 30th. A.r ; ho clewed the
option, and this agreement became the one Tinder which the subsid-
iary companies were secured: and as it gives the purchase price
as well as the method of payment its contents became of decided
importance.
#This agreement was made Feb. 4th, 1902 between Ismay,
Imirie and Co. ( ,,rhite Star vencors ) . Richard Mills and Co.
(Dominion vendors), Peter A. B. -''idener and Clement Griscom
(American vendors)* Bernard N. Baker (Atlantic Transport vendor)
and J. P. Morgan and Co. , termed the "Bankers". The object was
stated to be the acquisition of certain maritime properties and
interests by a corporation to be organized under the direction
of the vendors to .the satisfaction of the "Be nicers " for, and in
consideration of the issue therefor to the "Vendors", or their
representative:;, the total capitalization, being #120, 000, 000 in
stocks, and $50,000,000 of collateral trust debentures.
The properties to be acquired were : (a) 750 shares
(total is^ue f750.0G0) of the ccpitrl stoch of the Wh;ite Star
Line; also as far as the White Star vendors are able to dispose
of it, the position of the managers of the Oceanic Stee^-i Naviga-
tion Co. (b) The business, good will, and assets of the firm of
Richard Mills and Co. in connection with the British and North
American Steam Navigation Co. (Limited), and the Mississippi and
WW New York Journal of Commerce and Commercial bulletin May 16, 190?.
# N. Y. Journal of Com. and Com. Bulletin, May 19, 1902.

Dominion S. S. Co. (c) The Capital stock, property and assets of
the Atlantic Transport Co. (&) The capital stock, property s nd
assess of the International Navigation Co.
(e) 118,46? ordinary shares and 53,703 preferred shares of the
capital stock of Frederick Leyland and Co. , Limited.
The acquisition of the White Star and Dominion Lines
was to be dated from January 1st. , 1901 and they were to receive
50 interest on the purchase price from that time.
The considerations agreed upon were: (a) For the White
Star Line, ten times the net profits of the company for the year
1900. (b) For the "business of Ismay , Imiro and Co. including
their properties good rill and assets ten times their net profits
for the year 1900. (This does not include their profits fro::
the White Star Line. ) Ismay, Imire and Co. ap;reed to st.g.y out
of business for fourteen years. They were paid as vendors of
the White Star Line, 25^ in cash, 25^ in common stocks and 75$
•of preferred stocks. The valuation of the Dominion Line together
with the business of Richard hills and Co. was determined in
the same manner and they were paid 25$ in cash, 37^> in common
stock and 75'^ in preferred stock. The American Line
( Internat ional Navigation Co. ) and the Atlantic Transport Co.
were paid #18,000,000 in preferred stocks at par, $9,000,000 in
common stocks and £16,000,000 in cash. (The cash was for new
tonnage not included in the delivery of the property and also to
pay the debts with interest at 6)0). It was to be advanced when
needed. They paid #11,736,000 cash for the Leyland Line.
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The agreement further specified that all orders for
new vessels and for heavy repairing requiring to be done at s
United ^'ingdo i shipyard was to be given to Harlan, Wolff and Co.,
the latter agreeing to acoe t no orders from any other firm as
long as the steam sh^n Combine kent then busy. This agreement
of
was probably made in order to secure a cc.miu ity A interests with
the Hollrnd Line: as Mr. Pirie, one of the principal owners of
the Harlan, Wolff Ship Building Plant vras also one of the largest
owners of the Holland lines. Through hira a working agreement
was resched with the Holland Line.
All of the remainder of the common and preferred stock
was retained by the vendors* who, however, con tributed to the
corporation as working capital $786,000 in preferred stocks and
#6,500,000 in common stock at per. They transferred the $50,000,000
n
debentures , $2, 500 ,.000 preferred stock and 2 ,500 ,00jl common stock
of the corporation to the underwriting syndicate for $50 ,000 ,000
in cash. Counting the bonds at par value, the preferred at $90
and the common at $40 this would give the syndicate a profit of
$12 ,500 ,000. Mr. J. P. Morgan ws to receive for his work in
organizing the steam Ship Co. 5,000 shares of preferred stock
and 25,000 shares of common stock. These shares were to be de-
ducted from the amount the syndicate received. Decucting the
value of the shares which at the above retes are $1,450,000 the
syndicates have a net profit of $10,050,000.
The underwriting syndicate mentioned above was orrani-
zed by J. P. Morgan and Co. The Nev. York Journal of Com erce
says it is the same one that underwrote the Steel Trust; that its
existence was about to expire on the 15th. of May and it was re-
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newed for this latter work. 60$ of the oapitaliraa underwritten
at home and 40'.. abroad. The f irst call was made on the under-
writing syndicate May 4th. 1902 for 85$. By October 1902 80$ of
the underwriting had been called for. The stock was subscribed
and paid for by those in the corporation.
7$0n October 1st, 1902 these various properties were
organized under the title of the "International Mercantile Marine
Co." The company did not receive a new charter; but used the
charter of the International Navigation Co. , a Her Jersey corpor-
ation, whose charter was amended and changed. The capital stock
was increased from $15,000,000 to $120,000,000
—
$60,000,000
common and $60,000,000 preferred, (the dividends were limited to
10$ as long r f> any of the bonds were outstanding); also
$50,000,000 collateral trust bonds bearing interest at the rate
of 4 l/2$ per annum, payable in 20 years, the right being re-
served to redeem the same after five years at $105. Its internal
organisation very closely resembles that of the organization of
the Steel Trust.
As a pert of the organization scheme, sometime pre-
vious to Way, 1902, Mr. Morgan, on behalf of the company he was
organizing, entered into an agreement with the Hamburg-American
and Horth German Lioyd lines by which ,-"##The two German Cos.
agree each to pay to the corporation an annual sura equal to the
dividends on $50,000,000, or one fourth of their capital stock,
this amount to be increased proportionally as their capital stock
was increased. In return for which the corporation agreed to
pay the two companies 6$ annually on a corresponding capital"
# Investor's Supplement 1900, page 158.
Y. Journal of Commerce and Con. Bulletin. May 26th.
, 1902.

This Bgreement was clso accompanied "by a division of territory.
The corporation wss not to send any vessels to German ports
without the consent of the German Lines; while the German Lines
were to limit their traffic between England and America. A
pooling agreement was also entered into with regard to the cabin
and steerage passengers on the North Atlantic Lines. To adjust
all matters of dispute between the twoparties a board of arbitra-
tion was provided.
An agreement was also entered with the English Cos.
,
in order to allay English hostility to the scheme, by which
British vessels '-ere to remain British in reality; to continue
to fly the English flag, to be officered by English officers,
and to crrry Engl is 1- crews n far as possible.
The above is a brief historical account of the organi-
zation of the maritime enterprise, which at that time of its in-
ception, proved such a source of alarm to the British shipping
public; and which since its inception has been the source of so
much loss to the American security holders.
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-30-
Promot:on of the United States Steel Corporation.
The causes for the organization of the United States Steel
Corporation are largely to he found in the conditions existing in
Causes for its the iron and steel world. It is true tlv t there
ORGANIZATION . were certain economies to he effected by such an
organization. Economies in the utilization of ores, in transporta-
tion and manufacturing processes v/ere all considerations of no
small weight; hut if there had heen no other consideration the work
of the promoter would have heen indeed a most stupendous, if not an
almost impossihle one.
The latter part of 1898 and the opening months of 1899 were
marked by the formation of several large iron and steel companies,
including the "Federal Steel", "American Steel Hoop", and the
I "American Sheet Steel Co." The two preceding years had heen pros-
perous cnes in the' iron and steel trade. As all of these companies
ere capitalized on the basis of their earning powers, their cap-
italization in proportion to their actual assets, as a very large
one. In no case had it heen the policy of the directors to accu-
mulate a reserve fund#/A In every ca.se their preferred stock was a
cumulative one. From these considerations it can readily he seen
that they were in no condition either to endure a. period of de-
pression or to withstand severe competition.
On the other hand there was another company which had not kept
so close to the motto of large dividends at the risk of stability
]• The Carnegie Company. Since 1882 it had inaugurated a policy of
controlling all the factors contributing to the production of iron
vTrust Finance, par-'. 197
## " " " 19 6.
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and steel. It. had continued this policy until it was in possession
of two thirds of the Coking Coal in the Connellsville region. It
had vast ore interests in the Me sab i and Gogebic ranges ; also a
fifty year contract with the Rockefeller mining and ore interests
"by which vast quantities of soft ore were obtained . This ore it
transported, partly in its own fleet, and partly by long time
contracts, at very low prices to Conneaut Ohio. Prom there it was
transported by their own roads to the mills of Duquesne. Further-
more, the Carnegie mills were physically the best equipped in the
" rorld . They were concentrated in the center of the best steel mar-
ket In the United States; while the mills of most of the other
companies were widly scattered. The company had at its head the
greatest steel manufacturer ever engaged in the business. By virtue
of the above advantages the owner of this ©ompany was king of the
steel 7/0rid , hated and feared by the other manufacturers according-
ly.
Until the fall of 1900 there had been little competition among
these various companies. Orders had. been abundant and the profits
large. The Carnegie Co., the Federal Steel Co., and the
National Steel Co. were the three concerns most largely engaged in
the production of steel rails, billets, slabs and bars. They had
supplied these materials to the National Tube Co., The American
Steel and ,T1re Co., the American Tin Plate Co., the American Steel
Hoop Co. and the American Sheet Steel Co. These companies had man-
ufactured the billets and bars into their final products. The Fed-
eral Steel CO. v/as located in the West, The Carnegie Co. in the
Past, while the National Steel Co., supplying most of its output
;rTrust Finance, nage 200.
# " " " 199.
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to the Sheet Steel, and Hoop Companies was not a very strong com-
petitor to either. When, in the latter part of 1900 the price of
steel products "began to fall, in order to meet their dividends, a
policy of ret rtmchment "became necessary on the part of all of these
companies except the Carnegie Co. These companies had seen the
great advantage possessed "by the Carnegie Co. in its industrial
independency, and they sought to secure like advantage for them-
selves. At once the manufacturers of finished products "began to
prepare to produce the iron and steel needed themselves. The
Federal Steel plant and the Carnegie plant found themselves con-
fronting the prospect of a loss of their customers. They would be
compelled to seek elsewhere for a market for their products, or re-
sort to competition with their former customers by finishing the
iron and steel -'hich they produced into its final form. They chose
the latter. When the finishing companies after managing to secure
the raw materials, and arranging for its transportation, began prep-
arations for building mills to use this materialT the Federal
Steel and Carnegie Compa.nies "began preparation to establish plants
in which they could work their billets and slabs into the finished
forms. As a result of this the following situation existed: The
American Steel and Wire Cumpan:/ , was. preparing to build a large
mill at Milwaukee which would make them independent of the Federal
Steel Co. They had already begun the installation of a complete
system of production "below Pittshurg. As a counter move the
Federal Steel Co. put their threats to erect their own plant into
such tangible form that the former company had decided to renew its
contracts a while longer.
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On January 12, 1902 the Carnegie Oo. announced its intention of.
"building a large tube mill at Conneaut, Ohio. They proposed to
"build a sheet steel mill at Homestead, and they further more had in
comtemplat ion a railroad to the sear-coast. A war of competition
seemed inevitable in which the Carnegie Cc . must eventually emerge
victorious. The industrial situation pointed that way* However,
the holders of the large amounts of stocks in the various companies
realized that such a war would mean, first a suspension of divi-
dends, then a decline in the value of the stocks, with consequent
curtailment of their financial operations at a time when they prom-
ised large profits.
In the early part of 1901 the prices of iron and steel "began
moving upward, the money market became easier, with a consequent
increased willingness on the part of the public to "buy securities
tnr
of industrials. These conditions made it possible to avoid the
war. They made possible the formation of the Steel Trust; even more,
they made it possible for the promoters of that enterprise to se-
cure for the stock marketed a price much above its real value.
The nlan for the consolidation of the various companies was
prepared "by J. P. Morgan and CO,.## This task had first "been under-
taken and abandoned "by Judge Moore of Chicago. By
Method of the Morgan plan this new company was to he a hold
promotion.
. ing companjr. Mr. Morgan "began • ork in December
1900 He first secured the co-operation of the
largest stock holders in the various concerns to be taken over.
#Trust Finance
,
pa.ge 216.
#Renort of Industrial Commission.
###Com. and Fin. Chronicle 72 Vol. 441.
####Report Industrial Commission 1900, 13 Vol. 475.
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He then arranged with the Carnegie Co. the terms on which its stock
was to "be secured. His next step was to form an underwriting
syndicate representing 20C,000,000. This syndicate included many
prominent financiers in "both Europe and America, J. P. Morgan & Co.,
and also many of the large stockholders in the several companies.
This syndicate of which J. P. Morgan & Co. was to act as its agent
made a contract with the United States Steel Corporation which
provided that the Steel Co. was to issue and deliver to the syndi-
cate its stocks and 5^ gold bonds in consideration of the stocks of
the subsidiary companies to "be included, the "bonds of the Carnegie
Co. and :'25,000,000 in cash.#
On Feb. 5th. 1901, the Steel Corporation was incorporated
under the state laws of New Jersey with a capital stock of $3,000.
On March 2nd. its prospectus appeared. The prospectus was addressed
to the holders of stocks of the Federal Steel Co., National Steel
Co., American Steel a.nd Wire Co., of Mew Jersey, American Tin
Plate Co., American Sheet Steel Co. and the American Steel Hoop Co.
These companies in connection with the Carnegie Steel Co. repre-
sented from 55/1) to 7 5^ of the yearly output of iron and steel in
the United States. The prospectus was signed by J. P. Morgan &
Co., Syndicate Managers. It contained an account of the formation
of the Syndicate and its contracts with the Steel Corporat ior . . It
stated that the Syndicate had made an arrangement with + ,, e Carnegie
Co. to secure all of their stocks and bonds. The Steel Corporation
itself was to issue no bends except those required for the purpose
of securing 60/£ of the stock of the Carnegie Co.
/^Prospectus issued to shareholders of Subsidiary Companies.
## Report of Industrial Commission 1900 13 Vol, 475

Then followed an offer to exchange the stock of the new com-
pany for the stock of the various companies upon the following
terms: For each $100 par value of the stocks mentioned below the
amount set opposite thereto in preferred or common stock of the
United States Steel Corporation at par.
Name of Co. and Ain't, of new stock to be
Cla.ss of stock. delivered in par value.
Preferred C ornmon
1
.
Federal Steel Co. Preferred 110
Common '-t 107 .50
2 Am. Steel and Wire Co. Preferred 117 .50
Common 102 .50
National Tube Co. Preferred 125
Common 8 . SO 125
4. Am. Tin Plate Co. Preferred 125
Common 20 125
National Steel Co. Preferred 125
Common 125
6 . Am. Steel Hoop Co. Preferred 100
Common 100
7 . Am. Sheet Steel Co. Preferred 100
Common 100
This stock was to he transferred to J. P. Morgan <k Co. who
were to turn it over to the Steel Corporation in consideration of
the stocks of that corporation. J. P. "organ & Co. retained the
privilege of returning all stocks deposited with them if they
deemed it best to abandon the enterprise. The capital stock was
to be $850, 000 ,'000 one half common and one half 7f;cumulative ,pr< -
ferred . Bonds were not to be issued in excess of $304,000,000.
All of the stock of the Steel Corporation left in the hands of the
syndicate after making the exchange were to belong to them. The
forms of the new bonds, the indentures securing the same , and the
entire plan of the organization and management was to be de.cided by
J. P. Morgan & Co.
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Statements were made declaring the earnings of the various
companies for the last year were amply sufficient to pay a dividend
on all capital stock which it was proposed to issue, "besides making
|
a provision for a sinking fund and a maintenance of the property.
The "belief was expressed that "By the consummation of the proposed
arrangements the necessity of large deductions hitherto made on
account of expenditures for improvement will be avoided ;the amount
of earnings applicable to dividends substantially increased and a
greater stability of investment secured, without necessarily in-
creasing the price of the manufactured products."
In the first week of March the New York Exchange admitted to
quotations in the unlisted department the certificates of deposits
issued by the depositaries for the stock of the seven constituent
companies exclusive of the Carnegie Co. #The limit for depositing
the stock with J. P. Morgan & Co. was fixed at April 1st, 1901.
During the month of March arrangements were mo.de to secure the
control of the Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines Companjr and
The American Bridge Co. Their combined capital stock was
$90,000,000 for which they received 720,000 shares of common stock
and 740,000 preferred stock representing a total par value of
$14G , 000 , 000 . The exchange was made on the basis (par value) of:
U. S. - S. C. Stocks
Common Preferred.
American Bridge Co. Common 105
Preferred 100
L. Sup. Con. Iron Mines Common 135 135
##The amended certificate of incorporation was filed April 1.
#Pin. and Com. Chronicle.
##Articles of Incorporations and By-laws.
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1901, with a capital stock of $1,100,000,000, di
amounts of coinmon and lf (cumulative preferred stock. The increase
of the capita,! stock was due to the acquisition of the Lake
Superior Consolidated Iron Mines Co. and the American '.Bridge Co.,
and in view of the Company acquiring other property.
#. The real value of the property taken over has been variously
j
estimated. Ex-president Schwab testified in the suit brought to
restrain the conversion of ''200,000,000. of stocks into bonds that
the value of the property was:
1. Iron a,nd Bessemer ore properties- $700,000,000
(conservative estimate)
2. Plants (including; 440 producing mills
machinery, tools, equipment and
real estate) o00,000,000
3. Transportation properties ( including 1,467
miles of Ry. and 112 ships which
probably could not be duplicated )
80,000,000
4. Blast Furnaces 48,000,000
20,000,000
4,000,000
7. Cash and cash assets 148,000,000
Total 1,400,.° 9 1,000
Proiessor Jenks estimated the value of the property to be
about -7 o8,000,000. He places the amount of the stock of the sub-
sidiary* companies to be 1)950,000,000. 'hen we recognize the
fact that most of the constituent companies had been recently
consolidated and their stocks increased from 100 % to 300/.' of their
real value, we must cnclude Professor Jenks' s estimate the more
^Report of Ind. Com. 1900 13 Vol. 317-32
\
correct one.
The profits accruing to the underwriting syndicate and the
promoters in this instance was a large one., J. p. ? rorgan & Co.
receive as promoters pay for their work only in connection with the
syndicate. The original syndicate subscribed ! '200, 000 , 000
actually paid in 12,500,000
This amount was soon repaid and it was followed by four divi-
dend payments of 5$ or $10,000,000 each. They had left 40,000
preferred shares which, by subscribing for $5, 000,000. in the
stock conversion syndicate they were enabled to unload at par
value, making their operations as follows:
Nominal Liability of the syndicate . -$200,000,000
Actual cash paid in 12,500,000
Gash dividends, 23^ on am' t subscriber. 46,000,000!
Paid up subscriptions in the stock Ccn. syndicates 4,000,000 I
Total Profits 50,000,000
-Com. and ?? in. Chronicle. 76 Vol. 977.
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THE CONSOLIDATED TOBACCO COMPANY.
An the United States Steel Corporation represents the
greatest achievement from the standpoint ~f a promoter outside
of the industry he is promoting the formation of the Consolidcted
Tobacco Co. represents one of the gre- test achievements in the
manufacturing field by a man inside the business. The one man
more responsible for the existence of the Consolidated Tobacco
Co. than any other is James B. Duke. The foregoing Company was
incorporated under the state laws of New Jersey June 5th. 1901
# At the time of its incorporation it had a paid up cash capital
of |30,000,000 in co linon stock. It has never issued any pre-
ferred stock.
The condition giving rise to the formation to this
company may be briefly stated thus: In 1890 the five large com-
panies engaged in the manufacture of cigarettes in America
,
under the management of Mr. Duke were consolidated into the
American Tobecco Company. ##This company had a capital stock of
$25,000,000 and controlled over 75$ of the out put of cigarettes
in America. Later its capital stock was increased to $75,000,000
#r#The Subsidiary companies manufactured also a certain amount of
smoking tobacco, which brought them Into competition with the
other manufacturers of smoking tobacco . ///A'he American Tobacco
Company in the latter half of the last decade began a campaign
TvEarl Mayo's "Tobacco War", Frank Leslie's Magazine, March 1901.
.^Moody's Manual,
jnhmeport of ind. Com. 1900.
#?Wrobacco War, Frank Leslie's Magazine, March 1903.
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with the end in view of not only controlling the Smoking Tobscco
business but also the "lug tobacco business. In this latter i -
P.
dustry Lollard and Co. , and Llgget and Meyers were the two lar-
gest competitors. The firm of Llgget and Meyers were especially
hostile to the "Trustr They declared their intention of never
selling out to it. As the Llgget and Meyers Co. was the largest
manufacturer of tobacco in the world, it was essential that the
^frust secure their plant if it was to be dominant in the tobacco
business.
A war of competition ensued, in this competitive war
the American Tobacco Co. bought out the famous "Battle Ax" and
"Honesty" brands of chewing tobacco. So fierce was the war that
the "Irust" ST>ent $4,0 ( >o,ooo in advertising the "Battle Ax" brand
alone. In 1893 the United Tobacco Co. was formed ostensibly
for the purpose of 'uniting the tobacco companies fighting the
"Trust". This company secured possession of the majority of the
stock of the Ligget and Meyers Co. . and six months after its
organization the "Trust" had obtained possession of it. The
tobacco trust <1iow had the entire domestic field practically free
from all competition.
In December 1898 the Continental Tobacco Co. was for-
med with a capital stock of $100,000,000. $50,000,000 each pre-
ferred and common stock. / The American Tobacco Co. being a
manufacturer of cigarettes and smoking tobacco, and the new com-
pany manufacturers of plug tobacco , sold its plug interest to
the new company. Through this sale it became possessor of the
majority of the stock of the new company, and James B. Duke was
# Report of Industrial Com, 1900. 13 Vol. 517-32
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soon president of both companies.
Exclusive of the snuff trade these two companies con-
trolled the tobacco situation. #En order to control that import-
ant industry the American Snuff Co. was incorporated, the se-
curities of which were held jointly by the two companies.
As these three companies were practically controlled
by the same interests a more perfect unity of management was
sought. This was obtained through the organization of the "Con-
solidated Tobacco Co." ##This company was capitalized at $1800.
Shortly after its incorporation the president, Mr. Duke, issued
a prospectus calling the attention of the shsre holders of the
two companies to the fact that the company had been organized
as a holding company; and offering to exchange its bonds for the
common stocks of the two companies upon the basis of $100 in
bonds, par value, for $50 common stock, par value of the American
Tobacco Co.: and $100 in bonds par value, for $100 in stocks
par value of the Continental Tobacco Co. The capital stock was
to be increased to $30,000,000 common stock and the bond issue
was not to exceed the amount necessary to make the exchange for
the stocks of the two companies upon the ebove basis. iHHi" These
stocks to be exchanged were to be deposited with the Morton Trust
Co. of Hew York which was to issue 50 years, 4p, gold bonds for
them.
Just what profit, if any, Mr. Duke received for his work
as promoter does not appear. He was primarily a manufacturer of
tobacco and not of market securities. Doubtlessly the organiza-
tion of the holding company was attended with some profit; that
#Frank Leslie, March 1903, Tobacco Trust.
Jill ,
"ftptides of Incorporation and By-Laws of Consolidated Tobacco Co.
Prospectus Issued by company.

however was only of secondary importance to him.
The wisdom. of the unity of the two companies was shewn
left supreme in the United States, Cub: <\ v Philli >i es; to
their opponents was left Ireland and Engli nd; while the entire
tobacco trade in, other countries where tobacco is not a govern-
ment monopoly f virtually fell into the hands of the American Co.
which controls the cc nized for the ur o e of carry]
on the foreign tobacco trade. Wit] the exception of the cigar
business, a business into which it has recently gone into quite
extensively through the organization of the American Cigar Co.
.
Consolidated Tobacco Company is virtually • ster of t
tobacco rale. It has been the means Of lew sen i: o preat
waste through competition in the industry the end which r. Duke
declares he had ultimtely in view when he undertook the work of
organization. Furthermore it has concentrated to a great extent
the control of the business. Previous to the organizatior of
the new company $38,000,000 in stocks xit s - 'red to direct and
control the policy of the two companies; since then, as the or-
ganization of the company provided for a capital stock of
'30,000,000 any sum in exces- of one half that amount is suff icier
to wield control of a property whose value is upwards of
#175,000,000.
# Frank Leslie's Magazine, Mar. 1905. "Tobacco Trust" Karl Mayo.
by the tobacco war which follow 1th the English Companies.
#The result of this war r,; s Consolidated Company wes
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The Northern Securities Company.
After a "brief review of the promotions of the larger indus-
trial interests we turn now to a study of the methods of promotion
in the field of transportation.
The stirring events leading up to the organisation of the
Northern Securities Company, involving as they do, a clashing of
interests in some of the greatest railway properties of the West;
the mad struggle for the control of a certain railway stocks that
all hut precipitated a pan^c national in its scope; the magnitude
of the interests involved; the peculiar form of organization
adopted and the recent interference on the part of the United
States government, with that peculiar form of organization all
combine to make a most interesting study. All of the facts connect-
ed with this organisation are now atters of history. As an il-
lustration of the economic situation out of which emerge so called
combinations and monopolies; as an example of the means used to
consolidate various interests, and place in the power of a few
capitalists the prosperity and growth of a vast and fertile sec-
tion of a country with a population extending into the millions;
and as an outgrowth of a peculiar' principle of consolidation the
Northern Securities Co. is well worthy of careful investigation.
The oasis of combination was the "community of interests" and the
form of the organization one best suited to secure that end.
In the NorthwesL, there had in the last half century grown
un two great railway lines, extending from the Mississippi valley
#Prof. Filgus, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 251
» » n n it tt tt
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to the Pacific Coast, -the Northern Pacific and the Gr-;at northern.
The former v/as chartered in 18 r>4. it extended from Duluth to
Tacoma. In 1893 it had gone into the hands of a receiver, its
"bankrupt state being brought about through competition with the
Great Northern. By 189 5 J. p. Morgan and Co. had completed the
plan of its re-organization. Through this plan of re-organization
4,706 miles of railroad were welded together, and $147,000,000 old
4,
securities taken up with 222,700,000 new ones. In this process,
$-6,550,000 cor.imon stock and $10,800,000 cash and $17,50»\000
preferred stock were exchanged for 84
,
000
,
000 of the old stock,
leaving $72,000,000 of new stock( the . total issue being $155,000,000)
to be divided among the re-organization syndicate. Jas . J. Hill
and his friends aca^uired a total amount of $26,000,000 of the new
stock. Thus it can be seen that while J". J. Hill was the pre-
dominating factor' in the Northern Pacific that J". P. Morgan 8: Co.
by reason of their work of re-organization were interested in it
to a certain extent.
The Great Northern Railwa: System was started in 18" 7. In
1889, under the influence of J. J. Hill this line was re-or-anized
under the present name. Its capital stock was fixed at $20,000,000
and its bond issue at $80,000,000. It has since been purchased by
the Great Northern Co. This Co. acquired posses, ion of it by giv-
ing in exchange .^25,000,000 of its own stock for its $20,000,000
capita,l stock. This road extended about 100 miles north of the
Northern Pacific from Duluth to Everett on Puget Sound. It also
has a steamship line from Duluth to Buffalo-.
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There was yet a t ird company whose lines and ramifications
connected the larger cities of the middle west, -The Chicago Burling-
ton and Quincy. Originally chartered in 1851, it had grown to a
system embracing 8,171 miles with lines connecting Chicago and St.
Paul; Chicago, Lincoln and Omaha; and even extending as far west as
Billings Montana, on the Northern Pacific; Chicago, St. Joseph and
Denver; as well as lines connec J ing St. Louis and Kansas' City with
the above cities.
There were many reasons why this road would he a valuable
possession to the two northern roads. There were reasons also why'
it would he a valuable acquisition to the Union Pacific, a road
controlled by the Harriman interests and lying south of the Burling-
ton. In the first place the two roads entering Duluth needed a
Chicago connection, -the Burlington furnished it. The further
advantages of the control of the Burlington as pointed out by
President Hill were "The Burlington is favorably located, with
ample terminal facilities in the great traffic centers of the
middle west. In the south it connects with the chief cotton
carrying lines; it serves a country furnishing most all of its own
products except timber; a country furnishing the chief products
exported to Asia. These products the Burlington line would furnish
to the Northern lines, while in return it would receive from them
the timber of Washington and the live stock of the northwest
grazing country".
On the other hand the Burlington was talking of building
through to the coast. In this case its competition would be
ruinous to the northern Pacific. Should the Union Pacific let i1
fall into the hands of the ITorthern Pacific, from Billings eastward
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it would be an unpleasant competitor. Therefore, when in April,
1901, it became known that the Great northern Co. and the Forthern
Pacific had jointly purchased the Burlington it immediately de-
manded a share in the purchase as well as a favorable trackage
rights over the lines of the "Burlington as the purchasing companies.
#The two Northern roads had paid the Burlington $200 a share while
its value was $100 and the market value $130, issuing therefore
their joint bonds. Deeming themselves secure in its possession
they refused the Union Pacific's request. Immediately that road
set its agents at work in Europe to buy up Forthern Pacific stock.
By the first week in May they were the owners of over $60,000,000
of the stock. The situation was alarming to the Kill-Morgan crowd.
If tho Union Pacific should control the Forthern Pacific that meant
on their part a control of a half interest in the Burlington. As
Mr. Kill told his friends "Everything in the west was theirs from
Canada to Mexico except the Great Forthern."
##Mr . Morgan, as he said, seeing that the desire of the Union
Pacific to secure the control of the "Northern Pacific was not to
manage it with its best interests in view but for an ulterior ob-
ject, began, without the advice or acting on behalf of any one else,
and actuated only by motives of serving the interests of a road
which he had helped to re-organize bogan buying Forthern Pacific
stock. Stock that had only nine months before sold at $45.75 was
soon selling at $1000 a share . As a result of this effort to se-
cure control of the contested line the country was all but precipi-
tated in a panic
.
#Legal Fews
, March 23rd, 1904.
#=//Legal Fews, March 26th, '904.
[
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#y-#T;Tr . Morgan arranged a meeting of the contestants and it was
discovered that the Morgan^Hill interests controlled £42,000,000
common stock and the Harriman interests $41,000,000 preferred and
$37,000,000 common s ock. A truce was entered into whereby Mr.
Morgan was left to name the ^orthern Pacific hoard of directors.
This seeming surrender on the part of the Union Pacific interests
to their opponents was due to the fact that by a provision in the
Northern Pacific charter the common stock could pay off and retire
the preferred stock on the first of January of any year that they
chose to do so. Mr. Morgan named the following directors; J. J.
Hill, of the Great Northern Co., E . J. Harriman of the Union
Pacific, Wm. Rockefeller of the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul;
H. McK. Twomhl;. of the Chicago and Northwestern and Samuel Rea of
the Pennsylvania Ry. Co. On the first of October the above men-
tioned were elected directors. It then became evident that the
preferred stock would be retired, although strongly opposed by the
Harriman interests. Since, however, they could'nt help themselves
they proposed selling out the Union Pacific holdings of Northern
Pacific stock to J. P. "organ & Co,
To provide the capital for his purchase was a large undertak-
ing. In order that it might be best accomplished President Hill
says "it became nedessary for the men interested to act together
in a large and permanent manner through the medium of a corporation.
#At this time the purchase of the Great Northern Co. by the new
corporation was neither suggested nor contemplated.
For some years President Hill and others who were interested
in the great Northern Co., not including J. P. Morgan & Co., had in
###Michigan Lav: Review, 1 Vol. 251.
I #Legal News, March 25 , 1901. |
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contemplat ion the formation of a corporation for the purchase of
their interests in that company with the general object that the
interests should he held together. It was their desire to make the
Great northern Go's, policy of development a steady and continuous
one. About August 1st. 1901, as this plan was approaching maturi-
ty those parties decided to sell to the new company, being formed
by J. p. Morgan & Go. their interests in the Northern Pacific Go.,
which was considerable in amount,' and to urge that the capital
should be made sufficiently large to enable the holding corpora-
tions to acquire all of the shares of the Great Northern Co. as
well as the Northern Pacific Go. that it deemed advisable to ac-
quire. President Kill recommended and advised that all his friends
sell their Northern Pacific stock to the new corporation when
formed. As the Oregon Short Line, the purchasing agent of all of
the Northern Pacific stock owned by the Union Pacific refused to
#
sell out to the new company^ J. P. Morgan purchased their shares,
paying them partly in cash and partly in the shares of the new
company. The new stock paid to them was of sufficient amount to
represent about 23^ of the total capitalization.
This new company known as the Northern security Company was
incorporated November 13th. 1901. ##It was incorporated under the
state laws of 1Tew Jersey with a paid up capital of $30,000 and an
authorized capital of $400,000,000 or about $122 ,0.00,000 in excess
of the total capital stock of the two roads to be acquired. This
stock was not to be offered to the public. It was merely to be
exchanged for the shares of the Northern Pacific and Great Northern
#Journal-of Com. and Com. Bulletin, Mar. 21. 1903.
##Michigan Lav/ Review. Vol. 1 351.

railway s
.
Thus it was that, whereas previous to the organization of the
Northern Security Co., a community of interests had existed betwe m
the two roads, part of the shares in each company being held by
the owners in the other company. There was now a complete merger
of interests. The Northern Security Co. was to own, vote .and con-
trol the majority stock of each company. It was, however, not an
owner hut merely a custodian, according to the decision of the
United States Supreme Court, of the shares of the two companies
and being as such (X restraint of trade it could have no legal
existence.
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ROCK ISLAND COMPANY.
-
While the work of. the promoters in the Rock Island
Company differs from that of the promoter in not being undone
by the Supreme Court it also differs widely in method.
#At the beginning of the latter half of the nineteenth
century the Rock Island Railroad consisted of a project existing
only in the minds of its builders. A little later it consisted
of 185 miles ef poorly constructed, ill equipped track between
Chicago and the town on the Mississippi whose name it beers.
Across this river was a new and 8t that time undeveloped country,
a territory of boundless resources and almost inexhaustible fer-
tility. Into this territory the Rock Island began to penetrate,
and from a weak 1^'ne
,
paying its dividends with difficulty, by
the end of the century it had grown into a system of over 4,000
miles , and paying dividends equalled by few other roads in the
country.
Its rapid growth was due to two factors, its location
and its management. It had as it;; Eastern terminal, one of the
greatest market centers of the world, the railway metropolis of
the West. Fro.:i this, the .greatest of all railroad centers, it
extended into and through the richest grain regions of the con-
tinent. Frc:i Chicago westward it had but one line until it
crossed the Mississippi. From there its liii.es radiated out
through the greet states of Iowa, Missouri, Tennessee, Texas,
Kansas, Colorado, Nebraska, end Minnesota. Its increase in mileage
had been steady and ccnserative. At this stage in its growth came
the formation of the Steel Trust. Judge Moore and a party of his
/Railway Age, June 50, 190?,.
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friends were large holders of stocks in many of the subsidiary
companies included in that enterprise. Having disposed of their
interests in t he steel trade they were seeking a new investment
for their capital. They found in the Rock Island Ry. a situation
offering unlimited possibilities, commanding as it did the traffic
of a fertile section. of country whose resources as yet had hardly
began to be developed, fcamediately Judge Moore organized a
syndicate, which going into the open market purchased a controll-
ing interest in this Railroad. The capital stock at this time
Fas #50,000,000* and the shares whose par value was $100 were
quoted at $130. Therefore a controlling interest could hsve cost
then no less than $32 ,500,000. In June the capital stock was
increased to #75,000,000. This new stock being distributed to
the share holders at par represented an additional investment on
the part of the Moore syndicate of $12 ,500 ,000. They now had
invested an aggregate of #45,000,000 in a property whose capital
stock was $75,000,000.
Under their influence the road began to pursue to a
greater extent than before a policy of expansion. Irrtn the spring
of 1902 the Rock Island System secured control of the Chocotaw,
Oklahoma and Gulf Ry. 1G55 miles in length; the Burlington Cedar
Rapids r nd Northern, 1237 miles in length; the Rock Island and
Peoria, 119 miles in length; and the St. Louis. Kansas City and
Colorado, 105 miles. #7 7/The system was now 7500 miles in length
and the bond issue had reached the sum of $95,000,000 on the
main line.
/Railway Age, June, 30 1902.
##,Com. and Fin. Chronicle 33 Vol. 732.
T W " " " " 33 v 732.
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Tlie Mcorc syndicate, while at this ttoe desiring to
retain control of the property, yet desired to withdraw a portion
of their invented capital.w In other words i s a writer in the
"Railway Age" expresses it!' They desired to eat their cake and
yet have it." They fcregan seeking a means "by which this end night-
be accomplished. Obviously the most direct way for them to do
was to replace a portion of the stocks with bonds, this severing
the owning from the controlling power. Already, however, the
bonds represented 56 c/; of the capital of the property, a much
greater bond issue would most likely prove unsatisfactory, even
in the face o.f:' the gret earning power, of the company. Besides
the syndicate had a more ambitious policy in view than merely
separating the voting power from the owning power.
In the view of the large percentage of bonds outstand-
ing, in order to carry out the plan which they had determined
upon, the first move was not to increase any of the bonds, but
to increase the capital stock. The method whereby they made it
possible to retr in their control even with a much smaller in-
vestment while at the sane time the total capitalization was
more then doubled, must ever stand as the work of a financial
genus
.
The plan adopted was that of a holding company. The
official name of the Rock Island System was the Chicago, Rock
island and Pacific Railway Company.# On July 31st. 1902 the Chicago
Rock Island and Pacific Rail road Company was incorporated in I0.1 f.
for the purpose of acquiring the property of the Railway Company.-^
#Railway Age, June 30 1902.
ihr
(
" "
"
iHHt Com. and Pin. Chronicle. 75 Vol. 1157.

Its capital stock was fixed at $125 ,000 ,000.
On the Bame date the Rook Island Co. or New Jersey was
incorporated, its authorized capital stock being $150,000,000.
Wm. T. Rankin was the president of both companies. Ho sooner
had the Rock Island Co. been formed tha it proceeded to get
possession of all of the Chicago , Rock Island end Pacific Rail-
road bonds. #Then with its own stock, and the bonds of the ac-
quired company, it proceeded to net possession of the securities
of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company on the
following terms: For each sr.: re , of par value $100, of the
Railway Co. it paid $100 in 4$ gold bonds of the Railroad Co. ,
$70 in preferred stock of the Rock island Co. and #100 in common
stock of the Rock Island Co. The stock to be exchanged was to
be deposited w^th the Central Trust Co. before Sept. 1st 1908
and the new bonds issued November lot. In this manner the Rock
Island Co. secured about $69,000,000 out of the Railway Go's.
Total capitaliza". ion of #75 ,000 ,00-0'. SnPThe sheres purchased were
selling at about #185 a shsre on the open market; the new se-
curities immediately settled down to a market value of $90 for
the bonds
,
$70 for the preferred stock and $40 for the common
stock. Thus for each $185 in stocks the holders received about
$180 in stocks and bonds of the new company. The Rock Island Co.
had left, after paying for the securities purchased, about
$5,000,000 of its preferred and $30,000,000 of its common stock.
securities. The $95,000 ,000 in bonds, issued largely for the pur-
-HHh\\Q Rock Island was now burdened with the following
Chronicle. Se^t 7
,
1902.
#TOailwaxy Age , June 30 , 1002.

pose of acquiring the subsidiary companies, ca;;e first in the
priorty of claims for interest. After them, cones the #75,000,000
capital stock of the Railway Co. This capital while yet out-
standing is virtually cancelled, being covered by the stocks and
bonds of the new companies; This is true also of the capital
stock of the Railroad Co. After the outstanding bonds the next
security upon which interest must be paid are the $75,000,000
bonds issued by the Railroad Company; and after them the #54,000,000
preferred and the $96,000,000 common stock of the Rock Island
Company.
That the Moore syndicate was thus able to raise the
capital stock from $75,000,000 to $150,000,000 was due to the
extraordinary earning power of the property. #In 1900 the earning
power was sufficient to pay 11 3/8$ on $50,000,000 capital stock
and in 190?, 11$ on #75,000 ,000 capital stock. In the former
of the two years just mentioned the reported surplus , after
paying for increased equipments, improvements and maintenance,
was $5,000,000. The latter year it was $7,500,000. To pay 4$
on the $75,000,000 of bonds issued requires $3,000,000. Thus
in the year 1900
, 56$ of the net income and in 1902 , 2B$ would
have been sufficient to have paid the interest on the bonds.
During these two years it would have paid 3.7$ and 7.5$ on the
preferred stock allowing nothing on the common stock.
Since we have seen how the Increase of the capital was
brought about in a manner entirely consistent with sound financi-
ering we ere now r^ady to se<-! how the control of the property
was narrowed in the process. As has been previously stated the
^Railway Age, 54 Vol. 108.
1 vwQon. and Fin. Chronicle. (Investors supplement)
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the holding company's capital stock is divided into $54,000,000
non cumulative, preferred stock and #90,000,000 common stoc 1 .
#0ne of the peculiarities that marks the preferred stock is that
it is to bear dividends at the rate of 4 c/> until 1909, 5$ until
1916, and thereafter 6$. For our purpose this is not its chief
characteristic. $By the provisions of the charter the affairs
of the company are managed by a board of directors consisting
of five classes. The first class is always and under all cir-
cumstances , to ce a majority of the entire number. This class
is to be elected by the preferred stock holders and the other
four classes by the common stock holders. Through this provis-
ion a majority of the preferred stock holders by acting as a
unit can at all tines make themselves dominant in the management
of the company's affairs. Thus by retaining a majority of the
preferred stock, (less than #30,000,000 In value) the Moore
syndicate controls one of the largest railway properties in the
world, as this system also controls the Frisco System. This
acquisition took lace in 1905.
Tv-After obtaining possession of the Hock Island System
the holding company had left about $29,000 ,000 common stocks.
The Frisco System, a railroad radiating out from St. Louis to
the south and west, had a capital stock of about $100,000,000
divided into $5 ,000,000 , 1st preferred, #51,000,000 3rd preferred,
and #64,000,000 common.
Articles of Incorporation,
ralailway Age , June 30 1902.
fw " " 55 Vol. 854.
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in January 1903 numerous rumors became current that
the Rock Island Company war? Bhortly to acquire the Fr jsco System,
fTTOn Hay, 11th. 1903 thin merger became a foot, the Roc!: Inland
Co. securing possess ^on of it through the control of its common
stock.
#It is believed that J. P.Morgan and Co* were the large
holders of the Frisco Company stock who sold out to the Rock
Island. At any rate the merger wes negotiated through that firm.
The Rock Island gave in exchange for each share of Frisco
common par value $60, $60 per value of the Chicago, Rock I si end
and Pacific R-. ilroad Co's. gold bonds and an equal amount of its
own common stock. In order to do this it wi s necessary for the
Railroad Co. to increase their capital stock by $20,000,000 and
issue $18,500,1/00 b c/o gold bonds. These bonds and stocks were
acquired by the Rock Island Co. and used by the:;; in the Frisco
deal. v$The market value of the Frisco stock was about $78 a
share (May 15). The Rock Island stock at $42 and the bonds at
$85; therefore their exchange was at about their respective
market values.
The combined mileage of the two lines is 14,500 miles;
the value of the property, estimating it at $35,000 a mile,
fbout a half a billion dollars. To sc combine interests of such
enormous magnitude, In sue 1 a way as to make possible their
control by as small r sum as $29,000,000 is a piece of work
possibly parallel by any other promoter.
*>
^Railway Age. 35 Vol. 854.
vmJurrent Stock Quotations.
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CHAPTER 3
Cone lusion
.
An analysis of the promotion of the foregoing companies must
show that the promoter is not carrying on a work of philanthrophy.
It is true that the results reaped by him in the way of financial
returns are not always what he expects. This, however, only em-
phasizes the fact that his work is not unattended with risks. In
spite of his occasional failures the fact remains that the im-
pelling cause of his work is the desire for profit. This profit
may he immediate or it may come only in the future. That depends
largely on whether the promoter's connection with the enterprise
is to he permanent or not. In the example of the Consolidated To-
bacco and the Rock Island Railroad Companies where the work of
promotion was done 'through men who expected to retain a permanent
interest in the property no immediate large financial gains ac-
crued to them. In most of the other examples the work of the pro-
moter was undertaken in anticipation of an immediate reward.
That his work, especially in the later class of examples,
must have an appreciative influence on our industries cannot well
be doubted. There is, and must be, certain causes both enticing
and compelling in many industries which make the work of the pro-
moter possible. In some cases, as has been pointed out in the spe-
cial examples studied it is the evils of competition. In the Unit-
ed States Steel Corporation it was a case of threatened war which
promised the ruin of a. great many companies in one of our largest
and best developed industries. In other cases it is not the con-
dition inherent in the business. It is the personal appeal of the
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of the promoter to the manufacturer to go into the trust, osten-
sibly on the ground of the savings due to large comb inat ions , but
in reality in the hope of monopolistic prices for the manufactured
product added to the even more potent argument, the offer on the
part of the promoter to buy his plant at a price considerably in
advance of its market value. This was evidenced in the case of the
International Mercantile Marine Co. That company was organized dur-
ing a very prosperous period of the shipping industry. V/hen many
of the holders of shares in the White Star Line were in doubt as
to the advantages of selling to the proprietary company the man-
agers of the White Star Line expressly pointed out to them that
they were receiving a price far in excess of that which they had a
right to expect. A similar state of affairs existed in the promo-
tion of the Shipbuilding Co.
From the evidence obtained it would seem that in many cases
economic considerations or reasons are not the chief ones for the
promotion of an enterprise.
The causes directly responsible for their promotion are also
responsible for their magnitude. Primarily, as we have said the
promoter is working for profits. His profits, in most of the cases
studied, are made through the retention by himself of a certain
portion of the securities of the company which he organizes .• The
larger the stock issue the public can be persuaded to take at a
fair price the greater becomes his own profits. It is essential
that after the cost of the property acquired has been paid and the
cost of the promotion fully satisfied through the sale of the se-
curities that public* faith in the enterprise is manifest enough for

them to "buy even more stocks, the stocks which represent the pro-
moters profits. The larger the promoter makes the enterprise and
the more inclusive it sounds to the average investor the "better he
can jugjjLe with the amount of securities to be marketed. In every
case mentioned in the latter class the nominal value given to the
Capitalization* of the property represented. In the case of the
Mercantile Marine Co. the real cost of the property was about
£54,000,000. On the basis of this property $170,000,000 worth of
securities were placed on the market. In the case of the United
States Shipbuilding Co. the property was not worth §12,000,000 but
furnished a basis for the issuing of $70,000,000 in stocks and
bonds .$18 ,000,000 Is considered a liberal estimate of the value of
the property of the Tin Plate Co. It issued £44,000,000 in stocks.
While in the United States Steel Corporation one thoroughly versed
with its affairs would not value its property at over one half its
total capitalization which is $1,400,000,000. It is not to be under-
stood, however , that the promoter realized as profit the difference
between the nominal value of the securities and the real value of
the property plus the cost of promotion. In most cases the par val-
ue of the securities were far in excess of their market value. I'ost
of the bonds, since they were in only one instance, issued in excess
of the real value of the property, sold approximately near their
par value. The preferred stock was usually fixed at an amount which
the promoter thought likely the income of the business would be
sufficient to pay dividends on. After that came the common stock.
Although there has been hardly a single case in the latter division
Over securities were made far in ercess of the value

-no-
where dividends have been paid for any time on the common stock;
yet at the time of the formation of the various companies, matters
were always put in such a light that it seemed entirely reasonable
and likely that the common stock would he a dividend paying stock.
Since it is out of the last class of stocks the promoter looks to
a great extent for his profits the more plausible that he can make
it appear that it is a good investment the better for himself.
The Tin Plate Co. has never paid any dividend on its common
stock, theVrepresented no real value^ yet it is thought that Judge
Promoter's Moore was able to dispose of 100,000 shares which he
Profits. retained at about $44 a share, thus receiving about
$4,400,000 for his work of organization. # It is estimated that
Mr. Morgans profits in the formation of the Mercantile Marine Co.
approximated $1,450,000. According to the plans arranged by the
promoters of the United States Shipbuilding Co. the promoters prof-
its in that company were to exceed $6,000,000. Judge Moore, how-
ever, maintained that the promoters profits are not excessive. Ke
undertakes an enterprise the successful issue of which is open to
doubt. He requires large sums of money to invest in his enterprises;
money which is not really secured because of the very nature of the
work. The factory owners are hard to talk into a reasonable frame
of mind in regard to the sale of their plants. The public reception
of the new securities are always a matter of uneasiness to him. It
is this last phase of the promoter's work which gives rise to the
under writing syndicate. The underwriting syndicate was not used by
Judge Moore in the Tin Plate Co. As had been previously explained
# Report of Ind. Com. 1 Vol. 959-63.
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The he secured a cash option on the property needed., 3et
Underwriting a date on which it was to "be received, and then pro-
Syndicate. ceeded with the organization of the company, in the
meanwhile getting most of the sellers to agree to
accept stocks in the new company instead of cash. At the ajjpointed
time the securities and other evidences of ownership in the prop-
erty purchased were exchanged for the cash and stocks of the new
company. In that manner a large share of the stocks of the new com-
pany passed into the hands of the original owners of the property
and the public were appealed to to only a limited extent to "become
purchasers
.
The task of finding a sale for the securities of the new com-
pany was accomplished hy J". P. Morgan, as well as by Mr. Young,
through the agency of the underwriting syndicate. As soon as Mr.
T'organ undertook the work of promotion he organized a syndicate
which agreed to purchase, if necessary, a certain amount of the
securities to be issued. For these securities it assumed the task
of finding a market. Much of the promoters profits may come through
his connection with the syndicate. In the United States Steel Cor-
poration, Mr. Morgan's profits came exclusively through that source.
The underwriters profits were distinct from the promoters in the
Mercantile Marine Co. yet the underwriting syndicate played a very
important part in the promotion.
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The weakness of the underwriting syndicate in the Shipbuilding Co.
was one of the chief causes for that company finding itself in the
hands of a receiver at such an early date after its organization.
The underwriting syndicate gets its profits through offering to take,
and if necessary, taking the securities of the company at a figure
which will leave them a good margin of profit after disposing of the
securities to the public. In most cases their profits are large.
The syndicate in the Steel Co., although investing only $12 ; ';00,0GG
made a profit of $50,000,000, the International Mercantile Marine
underwriting syndicate made a profit of something like $10,000,000;
however in the Shipbuilding Co. the syndicate lost quite heavily.
I rfk method of inducing the public to buy these stocks which is
Somewhat more questionable than that of the underwriting syndicate
is the use of bonuses • To what extent this means is em-
Use of
ployed' cannot be definitly ascertained. Its main fea-
Bonuses
.
ture consists in giving to prominent financiers, or other
men commanding the confidence of the public shares of the stocks in
order to gain their influence. If the general public thinks the
stocks and bonds worthy of investment by such men they too will in-
vest in them.
The Rock Island Railroad, the Consolidated Tobacco Co. and the
"Northern Security Company, were promoted by men inside of the
business. The promoters - rere either men inside and inter-
Promoters
ested in it from a purely mercantile point of view, or
Ins ide
men who come into the business with a view of consolida-
of the
ting its various elements into one strong unified body in
Business
.
which they would be the dominant _ force . This latter case
/rJenk's Trust Problem.

is well represented "by the Rock Island Company, while the former
is well represented "by the Consolidation of the Tobacco Co. These
cases present many points in contrast with the preceding class of
cases. The capitalization is by no means so great in pro-portion
to the actual earnings power of the company. As a consequence
their securities, other things "being equal, have not reached so low
a price in the market as the following tahle will show.
Company. Preferred. Common.
United States Steel. 52 8 b/8
International Mercantile. 17 5
Tin Plate Co.
(previous to its acquisition by the
Steel Trusi) 65 18
United States Shipbuilding Co. ITo value. No value.
Consolidated Tobacco. 110
Rock Island Co. 6 5 20 3/4
ITorthern Securities.
(declared illegal "by United States
Supreme Court
.
)
A striking difference further noted is that in the Rock Island
Co. and the Tobacco Co. no
,
cumulative stock was provided for while
in the other instances a large amount of cumulative stock was pro-
vided.
In the last two cases the effect of the consolidation has not
"been this far to affect their stability. The object of the pro-
moter was the securing control of the property. That there is an
element of danger in placing such large interests in the hands of
so few men cannot "be doubted; but a discussion of that is out side
the limits of this article.
After the disclosures made in the organization of the Ship-
building Co. there is no need to state that the promoter has
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received altogether too little supervision at the hands of the law.
He is permitted to purchase valuable properties, or
Legal
properties of "but little value, with them as a basis,
Supervision.
capitalize a company at any amount that he may
choose; and offer its securities to the public as a good invest-
ment. Important facts may be concealed from the latter and even
many erroneous statements made, as in the prospectus issued by
Young in the promotion of the Shipbuilding Co. Under the laws of
Hew Jersey, as enforced, under which all of the companies were
incorporated the promoter is neither compelled to state the true
value of the property, nor the condition under which the stock is
issued. The re-nort of the Industrial Commission for 1900 recogniz-
ing this fact and the evil results arising therefrom has made the
following recommendations
:
(a) "That the promoters and organizers of companies or indus-
trial combinations which look to the public to purchase, or deal in
their stocks or securities should be required to furnish with d -
tails regarding the organization, the property or services for
which stocks or securities are issued amount and kind of same, and
all other material irformation for safe and intelligent investment;
(b) That any prospectus or announcement of any kind soliciting
subscriptions which fails to make full disclosures as aforesaid, or
which is false, should be deemed fraudulent and the promoters,
with their associates held legally responsible.
In the ITew York Companies Act the following section are to
be found in the connection with the promotion of corporations.
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"Every share of stock shall be deemed to he issued and shall
|
"be held subject to the payment of its par value in cash, unless he-
fore the- issuance of said stocks a contract shall be filed in the
registered office of the company which shall truly and fully die*
close in detail the considerations for which the said stock is
issued, whether the same is the property, service or otherwise".
This Act further promised that every prospectus or matt or of
any form, issued with the end in view of inducing subscriptions
must contain among other things the names of the promoters and
underwriters, their rewards, bonuses and the remuneration for their
services; the names of all parties entering directly, or indirectly
into contracts in regard to the promotion; the property purchased
or acquired; from whom, the exact considerations paid, or to be
paid for it, as well as a description of the property.
Should such provisions have prevailed on our statute books,
and have been properly enforced, as the ones just enumerated it is
altogether likely that the capitalization of most of the corpora-
tions just studied would be represented by an amount small in com-
parison with their present capitalization.
Less strongly too would have been the tendency away from
purely industrial principles into speculative fields. Under the
existing laws the tendency of the promoter is to
Tendency away
from purely unite a certain group of interests regardless of
industrial lines.
the economic advantages in so doing. As James
B . Dill expressed it, "He was not working on the corporate problem
to demonstrate an economic proposition from the standpoint of
economics". Rather he was looking for a more tangible return for
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}iis efforts. It mattered "but little to him if he plunged an indus-
trial field into a speculative one. Purely industrial and mer-
cantile principles were lost sight of in the desire for immediate
profit. This has "been demonstrated not only hy the over capital-
ization of the corporations; hut also the large issue of the pre-
ferred cumulative stock which took away from the directors their
power to conduct the business on conservative lines. There are hut
few classes of business where the earnings remain uniformly con-
stant. They vary continually. In many instances a number :.f years
may follow each other during which the income is hardly sufficient
to meet the costs of operation? and .repairs. To tide over such an
emergency a large surplus is almost a necessity. By providing for
a cumulative stock whereby the company is not able to accumulate a
surplus; hut must continue, even during those years when no earnings
are being made to' look forward to their prosperous years the
busines;: is rendered unstable. This thing' is not often done by a
conservative body of business men engaged primarily in a business
enterprise. It represents the means taken by the promoter to in-
crease the sale of the securities which he wishes to market; since
if an investor thinks that he is sure of T/o annually on his in-
vestment he is more likely to buy than if a cumulative provision
was not made
.
A brief summary of the work of the promoter thus far would
seem to indicate that his work is carried .on in the most cases for
temporary profit, and that he has taken many businesses
Summary
.
which were purely a field for investment and thrown them
into the field of speculation. He has not been properly held re-
sponsible by our laws, to the end that the public has bought from
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him lar -e quanities of securities of no real value whatever. His
profits, in most cases, have been out of proportion to the work ac-
complished. In some cases his attitude toward the public has been
one of deception and fraud. Unless he is more wisely curbed and re-
strained by intelligent legislation he is net likely to remain long
a respected factor in our industrial world. Rather he is likely to
become relegated to the class of purely industrial speculators
w] ere so many of that type now properly belong.
-Finis .
-
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